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Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

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  • Ken Binmore
  • Larry Samuelson
  • Petyon Young
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 506439000000000466.

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    Date of creation: 14 Mar 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000466

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    Cited by:
    1. Dai, Darong & Shen, Kunrong, 2012. "A New Stationary Game Equilibrium Induced by Stochastic Group Evolution and Rational Individual Choice," MPRA Paper 40586, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Aug 2012.
    2. Julián Arévalo, 2004. "Negociación Nash Gradual con Agenda Endógena: Un Modelo Trayectoria-Dependiente," Game Theory and Information 0407001, EconWPA.
    3. Ross Cressman, 2009. "Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 221-247, June.
    4. Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013. "Learning to be fair," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 181-195.
    5. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.
    6. BOCHET, Olivier & KLAUS, Bettina & WALZL, Markus, 2007. "Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods," CORE Discussion Papers 2007061, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Bagnoli, Lidia & Negroni, Giorgio, 2013. "The evolution of conventions in minimum effort games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 259-277.
    8. Luciano Andreozzi, 2008. "Property Rights and Investments: An Evolutionary Approach," Department of Economics Working Papers 0822, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    9. Younghwan In, 2005. "A Fictitious-Play Model of Bargaining To Implement the Nash Solution," Departmental Working Papers wp0509, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
    10. Naidu, Suresh & Hwang, Sung-Ha & Bowles, Samuel, 2010. "Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 31-33, October.
    11. Xiudeng Zheng & Ross Cressman & Yi Tao, 2011. "The Diffusion Approximation of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Mean Effective Fixation Time and the Significance of the One-Third Law," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 462-477, September.
    12. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Newton, Jonathan, 2014. "A classification of bargaining solutions by evolutionary origin," Working Papers 2014-02, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised Apr 2014.
    13. Juana Santamaria-Garcia, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection In The Nash Demand Game. An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-34, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    14. Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November.
    15. Julian J. Arevalo, 2005. "Gradual Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda: A Path-Dependent Model," Game Theory and Information 0502004, EconWPA.

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