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Learning in nonlinear pricing with unknown utility functions

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  • Kimmo Berg
  • Harri Ehtamo

Abstract

Optimal screening is one of the basic models of contracting under incomplete information, and we study the problem in a quality pricing application. We present a simple numerical method for solving the pricing problem when the firm has limited information about the buyers’ utility functions. In the method, the firm learns the optimal price schedule as the demand data is collected. We examine what the firm can learn about the preferences by observing the sales, and how the revealed information can be used in adjusting the quality-price bundles to increase the profit. We analyze the properties of the solution and derive the first-order optimality conditions under different assumptions. We show that the problem can be solved by making use of these optimality conditions together with the buyers’ marginal valuations. The firm can estimate the marginal valuations either by offering linear tariffs or by selling test bundles near the current solution. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Suggested Citation

  • Kimmo Berg & Harri Ehtamo, 2009. "Learning in nonlinear pricing with unknown utility functions," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 375-392, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:172:y:2009:i:1:p:375-392:10.1007/s10479-009-0640-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-009-0640-2
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    Cited by:

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    2. Kimmo Berg, 2013. "Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 206(1), pages 23-37, July.
    3. Kimmo Berg & Harri Ehtamo, 2012. "Continuous learning methods in two-buyer pricing problem," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 75(3), pages 287-304, June.
    4. Pavlin, J. Michael, 2017. "Dual bounds of a service level assignment problem with applications to efficient pricing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 262(1), pages 239-250.
    5. Mingli Zheng & Chong Wang & Chaozheng Li, 2016. "Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection When the Insurer Has Ambiguity about the Composition of the Consumers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 17(1), pages 179-206, May.

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