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Starke Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen: Wichtiger als direkte Demokratie und Föderalismus? Ein erster Blick auf die Daten

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Author Info
Mark Schelker
Reiner Eichenberger

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Abstract

Politico-economic analyses of democratic governance neglect the influence of independent audit institutions. While it is almost impossible to investigate their effect in a crosscountry design, we focus at the Swiss local level where audit courts play an important role. We collect cross-cantonal data on the strength of audit courts and econometrically analyze their impact on political outcomes, in particular on the tax burden and government spending. The results are astonishing: Powerful audit courts systematically lead to lower tax burden and government spending. The size of the effect is large especially if compared to other institutions such as referenda and local autonomy.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES) in its journal Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): 139 (2003)
Issue (Month): III (September)
Pages: 351-373
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Handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:2003-iii-6

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Related research
Keywords: Politischer Wettbewerb; institutionelle Innovationen. Rechnungshof;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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    Other versions:
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  4. von Hagen, Jurgen, 1991. "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 199-210, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Gibbons, Robert, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-32, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-84, October.
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  8. Feld, Lars P & Savioz, Marcel R, 1997. "Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 507-38.
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  10. Lars P Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2001. "The political economy of direct legislation: direct democracy and local decision-making," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 329-367, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Matsusaka, John G, 1995. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 587-623, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Benno Torgler, 2004. "A Knight Without a Sword or a Toothless Tiger? The Effects of Audit Courts on Tax Morale in Switzerland," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Benno Torgler & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2005. "The Determinants of Political Discussion: How Important are Audit Courts and Local Autonomy?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-28, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
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