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Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment

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  • Blume, Lorenz
  • Voigt, Stefan

Abstract

This is the first study that assesses the economic effects of differences in organizational design of supreme audit institutions (SAIs) on a cross-country basis. The effects on three groups of economic variables are estimated, namely on (1) fiscal policy, on (2) government effectiveness and corruption, and on (3) productivity. On the basis of up to 40 countries, differences in the independence, the mandate, the implementation record, and the organizational model of the SAIs do not seem to have any clear-cut effect on any of the three groups of dependent variables. There is only one exception: perceived levels of corruption are significantly higher if the SAI is structured along the court model of auditing.

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  • Blume, Lorenz & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 215-229, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:2:p:215-229
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    21. Tomic, Slobodan & Rauh, William Jonathan, 2023. "How Political Culture Shapes Horizontal Accountability Outcomes: Evidence from 62 Countries," SocArXiv uf3nw, Center for Open Science.

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