Ein neues Bankinsolvenzrecht für die Schweiz
AbstractIn Switzerland, new bank insolvency legislation is under consideration. The article compares the proposed regulation with the rules that would be optimal from an economic point of view. Optimal rules are a compromise between value maximization and absolute priority on the one hand (ex post optimality), and the avoidance of perverse incentives on the other (ex ante optimality). Existing Swiss rules are severely deficient in these respects. In contrast, the proposed revision is a reasonable approximation to an economic optimum in some respects, while it deviates from it in others.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES) in its journal Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 139 (2003)
Issue (Month): II (June)
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Corporate bankruptcy; Insolvency regulation; Bank restructuring; Systemic stability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
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