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Homophily, networks, and critical mass: Solving the start-up problem in large group collective action

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  • Damon M. Centola

Abstract

Formal theories of collective action face the problem that in large groups a single actor makes such a small impact on the collective good that cooperation is irrational. Critical mass theorists argue that this ‘large group problem’ can be solved by an initial critical mass of contributors, whose efforts can produce a ‘bandwagon’ effect, making cooperation rational for the remaining members of the population. However, critical mass theory requires an explanation of how a critical mass can form in the first place. I present a model of collective action that solves this problem by showing how aspects of social structure – including network topology, homophily, and local coalition formation – can allow rational actors to endogenously form a critical mass. The findings indicate that as the mobilization effort becomes more ‘complex’, clustered networks and homophily become increasingly important for critical mass collective action.

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  • Damon M. Centola, 2013. "Homophily, networks, and critical mass: Solving the start-up problem in large group collective action," Rationality and Society, , vol. 25(1), pages 3-40, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:25:y:2013:i:1:p:3-40
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463112473734
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Scatà, Marialisa & Di Stefano, Alessandro & La Corte, Aurelio & Liò, Pietro & Catania, Emanuele & Guardo, Ermanno & Pagano, Salvatore, 2016. "Combining evolutionary game theory and network theory to analyze human cooperation patterns," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 17-24.
    4. Joël Berger, 2021. "Social Tipping Interventions Can Promote the Diffusion or Decay of Sustainable Consumption Norms in the Field. Evidence from a Quasi-Experimental Intervention Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, March.
    5. Alessandro Di Stefano & Marialisa Scatà & Aurelio La Corte & Pietro Liò & Emanuele Catania & Ermanno Guardo & Salvatore Pagano, 2015. "Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(10), pages 1-21, October.
    6. Lu, Peng, 2015. "Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners’ dilemma games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 436(C), pages 327-337.
    7. Lu, Peng & Wang, Zheng & Nie, Shizhao & Pujia, Wangmo & Lu, Pengfei & Chen, Baosheng, 2018. "Exploring the participate propensity in cyberspace collective actions: The 5‰ rule," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 503(C), pages 582-590.
    8. Hakobyana, Zaruhi & Koulovatianos, Christos, 2019. "Populism and polarization in social media without fake news: The vicious circle of biases, beliefs and network homophily," CFS Working Paper Series 626, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    9. Lu, Peng, 2016. "Predicting peak of participants in collective action," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 274(C), pages 318-330.
    10. Yuan Hsiao, 2022. "Network diffusion of competing behaviors," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 47-68, May.
    11. Ruth Sessler Bernstein & Morgan Bulger & Paul Salipante & Judith Y. Weisinger, 2020. "From Diversity to Inclusion to Equity: A Theory of Generative Interactions," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 395-410, December.
    12. Lu, Peng, 2019. "Heterogeneity, judgment, and social trust of agents in rumor spreading," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 350(C), pages 447-461.

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