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The Technology of Public Goods, Externalities, and the Exclusion Principle

In: Economic Analysis of Environmental Problems

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  • Charles Plott
  • Robert Meyer

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  • Charles Plott & Robert Meyer, 1975. "The Technology of Public Goods, Externalities, and the Exclusion Principle," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Analysis of Environmental Problems, pages 65-94, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:2833
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Foley, Duncan K, 1970. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(1), pages 66-72, January.
    2. Ellickson, Bryan, 1973. "A Generalization of the Pure Theory of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 417-432, June.
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    1. R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton, 2013. "Just the Facts Ma’am: A Case Study of the Reversal of Corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-35439-6.
    2. Steven C. Hackett, 1992. "Heterogeneity and the Provision of Governance for Common-Pool Resources," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 325-342, July.
    3. Roy Gardner & Elinor Ostrom & James M. Walker, 1990. "The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(3), pages 335-358, July.
    4. John A. Weymark, 2004. "Shared Consumption : A Technological Analysis," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 75-76, pages 175-195.
    5. Charles Plott, 2014. "Public choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 331-353, December.
    6. Elinor Ostrom, 1989. "Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 11-50, July.

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