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Concealing to reveal: The informational role of Islamic dress

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  • David S. Patel

Abstract

After the resurgence of headscarves throughout the Muslim world, some women adopted ‘more fundamentalist’ clothing styles, such as full-face veils, or began pietistic social movements. What explains this escalation and increasing diversity of Islamic dress and behavior? This paper analyzes how the spread of headscarves and Islamic dress since the 1970s undermined it as a signal of piety, which is a valuable yet hidden characteristic in many social interactions. As less pious women adopted the headscarf for myriad reasons, pious women adopted increasingly conservative dress and behavior to credibly signal their piety to uninformed observers and improve their marriage prospects. The spread of ‘fundamentalist’ behaviors does not necessarily imply a societal shift in piety, ideology, or support for political Islamists.

Suggested Citation

  • David S. Patel, 2012. "Concealing to reveal: The informational role of Islamic dress," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(3), pages 295-323, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:24:y:2012:i:3:p:295-323
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463112440683
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Clingingsmith & Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Michael Kremer, 2009. "Estimating the Impact of The Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam's Global Gathering," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(3), pages 1133-1170.
    2. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
    3. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Paul Carvalho, 2017. "Coordination and culture," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 449-475, October.
    2. Binzel, Christine & Carvalho, Jean-Paul, 2013. "Education, Social Mobility and Religious Movements: A Theory of the Islamic Revival in Egypt," IZA Discussion Papers 7259, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Cristina Giuliani & Maria Giulia Olivari & Sara Alfieri, 2017. "Being a “Good” Son and a “Good” Daughter: Voices of Muslim Immigrant Adolescents," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-20, November.
    4. Luke Condra & Mohammad Isaqzadeh & Sera Linardi, 2015. "Selecting (In) and Crowding Out: Experimental Evidence of the Power of Religious Authority in Afghanistan," Framed Field Experiments 00398, The Field Experiments Website.
    5. Przepiorka, Wojtek & Andreas, Diekmann, 2021. "Parochial cooperation and the emergence of signalling norms," SocArXiv 9tg2f, Center for Open Science.
    6. Vincenz Frey, 2017. "Boosting trust by facilitating communication: A model of trustee investments in information sharing," Rationality and Society, , vol. 29(4), pages 471-503, November.
    7. Charles Crabtree & Holger L Kern & David A Siegel, 2020. "Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the dictator’s dilemma," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 409-434, July.
    8. Corekcioglu, Gozde, 2021. "Unveiling the effects of a headscarf ban: Evidence from municipal jobs in Turkey," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 382-404.

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