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Shall We Be Resolute?

Author

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  • Marie Uzan-Milofsky

    (Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method Department, London School of Economics, London, WC2A 2AE, m.m.milofsky@lse.ac.uk)

Abstract

Can we change our rational mode of deliberation in order to benefit from cooperation? Two philosophers believe we can. Indeed, David Gauthier and Ned McClennen argue that it is rational to replace the standard form of rationality as described in game theory with a constrained form of rationality. Such a change of rationality is possible because it enables agents to gain from mutual advantage and to avoid the costs of enforcement systems. If these philosophers are right, the consequences of their argument would be groundbreaking in social contract theories. Unfortunately, in this article, I want to argue that the change of rationality they claim possible is not only rationally inferior to the standard form of rationality but is also non-viable as a stand-alone rational concept.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie Uzan-Milofsky, 2009. "Shall We Be Resolute?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(3), pages 337-357, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:21:y:2009:i:3:p:337-357
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463109337091
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McClennen,Edward F., 1990. "Rationality and Dynamic Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521360470.
    2. Farina, Francesco & Hahn, Frank & Vannucci, Stefano (ed.), 1996. "Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198289814.
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