Public Choice of Tax and Regulatory Instruments—The Role of Heterogeneity
AbstractIn the authors' political equilibrium model, regulation is considered an implicit and regressive tax-equivalent alternative to the common and less regressive fiscal alternatives: income, property, and sales taxes. The authors hypothesize that in more heterogeneous jurisdictions the state relies more on regulation and less on budgetary spending than in more homogeneous units. Using data drawn from U.S. state-level environmental policy from 1980 to 1994, the authors confirm this hypothesis.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Public Finance Review.
Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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