Local Redistribution Financed by Income Tax
AbstractIn this article, a positive model of local income redistribution financed by income tax is developed. The tax rate and the level of redistribution within a community are determined through majority voting. The amount of redistribution that each local government can undertake is constrained by housing market distortions and by the ability of people to freely move from one jurisdiction to another. The author establishes a number of equilibrium conditions with a general form of the utility function. The three different sets of numerically computed equilibria are developed. The first set of computational equilibria is developed assuming voters are less sophisticated. These results are compared with the results of the property tax-financed redistribution-computed equilibria in Epple and Romerâ€™s study. The second set of computational equilibria are developed assuming voters are highly sophisticated. The third set are developed assuming that land rents are equally divided among the entire population.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Public Finance Review.
Volume (Year): 29 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
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- Schmidheiny, Kurt, 2006.
"Income segregation from local income taxation when households differ in both preferences and incomes,"
Regional Science and Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 270-299, March.
- Kurt Schmidheiny, 2005. "Income Segregation from Local Income Taxation When Households Differ in Both Preferences and Incomes," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0509, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Stephen Calabrese & Dennis Epple, 2010. "On the political economy of tax limits," Working Papers 2010/14, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
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