On the political economy of tax limits
AbstractWe study the political economy of state limitations on the taxing powers of local governments, investigating the effects of such restriction on housing markets, community composition, and types of taxes and expenditures undertaken by local governments. We characterize equilibrium when voters choose values of multiple policy (tax and expenditure) instruments, finding that tax limitations have very substantial effects on housing prices and the composition of communities. Political support for tax limits comes from suburban voters and from a subset of central-city voters. Support for tax limits come even from residents of communities that are not constrained by the limits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2010/14.
Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Tax limits; redistribution; public goods; property tax; income tax; head tax;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2010-05-02 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2010-05-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-05-02 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2010-05-02 (Public Finance)
- NEP-URE-2010-05-02 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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