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Does It Make Sense To Double Count? Problems in Assessing Rent-Seeking Costs

Author

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  • John G. Cullis

    (University of Bath)

  • Philip R. Jones

    (University of Bath)

Abstract

Identification of the welfare costs associated with rent seeking depends sensitively on the conditions that pertain to each case being considered It is dangerous to suppose that a particular rule will apply across the board. This argument is illustrated with respect to two examples. In the first example, the extent of rent-seeking costs is shown to depend on whether or not rent seekers are able to benefit from the X-inefficiency that is created by monopoly provision. In the second example, the alleged preference that external diseconomies be corrected by regulation rather than by penalty taxes is shown to be sensitive to individuals'perception of tax costs.

Suggested Citation

  • John G. Cullis & Philip R. Jones, 1992. "Does It Make Sense To Double Count? Problems in Assessing Rent-Seeking Costs," Public Finance Review, , vol. 20(3), pages 378-389, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:378-389
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219202000306
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-147, March.
    2. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
    3. Roger Congleton, 1988. "Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 181-184, February.
    4. Brooks, Michael A & Heijdra, Ben J, 1989. "An Exploration of Rent Seeking," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 65(188), pages 32-50, March.
    5. Michael A. Brooks & Ben J. Heudra, 1989. "An Exploration of Rent Seeking," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 65(1), pages 32-50, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jones, Philip & Cullis, John, 1996. "Legitimate and illegitimate transfers: Dealing with "political" cost-benefit analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 247-257, June.

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