Equilibrium Explanation of Bargaining and Arbitration in Major League Baseball
AbstractArbitration in Major League Baseball can be explained by baseball clubs "lack of information regarding their players" risk attitudes. Different player risk attitudes yield different contract zones of potential settlements. Profit-maximizing baseball clubs must sacrifice some potential settlements to minimize their expected payments to players. Mixed strategies in arbitration offers by players and settlement offers by clubs yield an equilibrium in a game with asymmetric information. The history of arbitration outcomes is explained by the predicted selection of cases for arbitration.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Journal of Sports Economics.
Volume (Year): 2 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.