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Incentives and Strategic Behavior of Professional Boxers

Author

Listed:
  • Zafer Akin
  • Murat Issabayev
  • Islam Rizvanoghlu

Abstract

In professional boxing, a higher-ranked boxer chooses his opponent among challengers varying in popularity and strength. We build a three-stage model of a professional boxing fight between the chooser and a challenger to examine the strategic incentives of a chooser in sharing the purse and exerting a proper level of effort. More importantly, we endogenize the choice of the opponent and the purse to be generated. We found that an older chooser who is ready to cash in his reputation tends to choose a stronger opponent with little effort, while a young rising “star†prefers a match against weaker opponents.

Suggested Citation

  • Zafer Akin & Murat Issabayev & Islam Rizvanoghlu, 2023. "Incentives and Strategic Behavior of Professional Boxers," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 24(1), pages 28-49, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:24:y:2023:i:1:p:28-49
    DOI: 10.1177/15270025221100203
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Rafael Tenorio, 2006. "On the Competitive Structure in Professional Boxing, Or Why the Best Boxers Very Seldom Fight Each Other," Chapters, in: Wladimir Andreff & Stefan Szymanski (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Sport, chapter 37, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    boxing; incentives; contests; opponent choice; bargaining; game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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