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A Tournament of Party Decision Rules

Author

Listed:
  • James H. Fowler

    (Department of Political Science University of California, San Diego)

  • Michael Laver

    (Department of Politics New York University)

Abstract

Following Axelrod's tournaments for strategies in the repeat-play prisoner's dilemma, we ran a ``tournament of party decision rules'' in a dynamic agent-based model of party competition. We asked researchers to submit rules for selecting party positions in a two-dimensional policy space, pitting each rule against all others in a suite of long-running simulations. The most successful rule combined a number of striking features: satisficing rather than maximizing in the short run, being ``parasitic'' on choices made by successful rules, and being hardwired not to attack other agents using the same rule. In a second suite of simulations in a more evolutionary setting in which the selection probability of a rule was a function of the previous success of agents using the same rule, the rule winning the original tournament pulled even further ahead of the competition.

Suggested Citation

  • James H. Fowler & Michael Laver, 2008. "A Tournament of Party Decision Rules," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(1), pages 68-92, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:52:y:2008:i:1:p:68-92
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002707308598
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laver, Michael, 2005. "Policy and the Dynamics of Political Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(2), pages 263-281, May.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    3. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    4. Kollman, Ken & Miller, John H. & Page, Scott E., 1992. "Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 929-937, December.
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