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Defense Expenditures and Allied Cooperation

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  • Toshihiro Ihori

    (Department of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

This article investigates the implications of cooperative and noncooperative defense spending of allied countries in conflicting blocs using static and leader-follower game models. It is well known that in the three-country world with two allies and an adversary, all countries may be worse off when the allies cooperate than when they do not. This article shows that when the number of countries in each separate bloc is large, the countries in one bloc may be better off by cooperating than not, even if the negative spillover from the adversarial bloc is large. Furthermore, cooperative behavior in a leader-follower game by the leader bloc can attain a better outcome than noncooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Toshihiro Ihori, 2000. "Defense Expenditures and Allied Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 854-867, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:44:y:2000:i:6:p:854-867
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044006009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wolfgang Buchholz & Richard Cornes & Dirk Rübbelke, 2018. "Public goods and public bads," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(4), pages 525-540, August.
    2. Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2010. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 763-787, August.
    3. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
    4. Jomana Amara, 2008. "Nato Defense Expenditures: Common Goals Or Diverging Interests? A Structural Analysis," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(6), pages 449-469.

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