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Threshold Effects and the Decline of Cooperation

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  • Rudolf Schuessler

    (University of Duisburg)

Abstract

Game-theoretical analyses of the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and of group production have largely ignored the impact of threshold effects on the evolution of cooperation. This article introduces a model where uncooperative action cannot be detected as long as it does not exceed a certain level. The resulting breakdown of cooperation parallels the backward induction effect of a finitely repeated PD and might illustrate pessimistic social theories like Olson's “institutional sclerosis.†But surprisingly, cooperation remains at an intermediate level if simple random variations of population size occur. This hints at the possibility that the mentioned pessimism is an often overrated position.

Suggested Citation

  • Rudolf Schuessler, 1990. "Threshold Effects and the Decline of Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 476-494, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:34:y:1990:i:3:p:476-494
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002790034003005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
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    3. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
    4. Bendor, Jonathan & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1987. "Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 129-154, March.
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