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Deterrence or Escalation?

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  • Mark Irving Lichbach

    (Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago)

Abstract

Aggregate data studies of domestic political conflict have used an Action-Reaction (AR) model that has produced contradictory findings about the repression/dissent nexus: Repression by regimes may either increase or decrease dissent by opposition groups. To clarify these findings I propose an alternative Rational Actor (RA) model from which are derived three propositions. (1) An increase in a government's repression of nonviolence will reduce the nonviolent activities of an opposition group but increase its violent activities. (2) The balance of effects, that is, whether an increase in the regime's repression increases or decreases the opposition group's total dissident activities, depends upon the government's accommodative policy to the group. (3) Consistent government accommodative and repressive policies reduce dissent; inconsistent policies increase dissent. The RA model thus accounts for the contradictory findings produced by the AR-based aggregate data studies of repression and dissent.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Irving Lichbach, 1987. "Deterrence or Escalation?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 266-297, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:2:p:266-297
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002787031002003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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