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Partial Takeovers: Are They Coercive?

Author

Listed:
  • Steve Bishop

    (Australian Graduate School of Management)

  • Peter Dodd

    (Australian Graduate School of Management)

Abstract

Considerable publicity has been given to the call for further regulating partial takeover bids in Australia. This call is largely based on a premise that they coerce shareholders into accepting a takeover offer which will decrease their wealth. An alternate argument is that in a competitive market for corporate control partial takeovers will increase the wealth of shareholders, not decrease it. In this paper, data reported in the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee's Discussion Paper No. 2 is extended and evaluated in a conceptual framework. The evidence is consistent with partial takeovers being shareholder-wealth-increasing events.

Suggested Citation

  • Steve Bishop & Peter Dodd, 1987. "Partial Takeovers: Are They Coercive?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 12(1), pages 9-22, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ausman:v:12:y:1987:i:1:p:9-22
    DOI: 10.1177/031289628701200102
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Terry S. Walter, 1984. "Australian Takeovers: Capital Market Efficiency and Shareholder Risk and Return," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 9(1), pages 63-118, June.
    2. Bradley, Michael, 1980. "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 345-376, October.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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