IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/amerec/v39y1995i1p23-31.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

If Art is Resold, Should the Artist Profit?

Author

Listed:
  • Edmund H. Mantell

Abstract

This paper analyzes the market adjustments to pending Federal legislation that would impose mandatory royalties on resales of works of fine art. The pending legislation is ostensibly motivated to confer economic benefits on artists who have not yet established themselves in the market. An important provision of the legislation is that it forbids the artist to waive his right to the re-sale royalty. The paper conducts a partial equilibrium welfare analysis to measure the allocative effects of the statute. Three propositions are established that demonstrate that the pending legislation will induce a net welfare loss as well as effect a redistribution of income from artists to a subset of purchasers. The policy implication of the proposition is that if the pending legislation is enacted, it will pervert the legislative intent.

Suggested Citation

  • Edmund H. Mantell, 1995. "If Art is Resold, Should the Artist Profit?," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 39(1), pages 23-31, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:amerec:v:39:y:1995:i:1:p:23-31
    DOI: 10.1177/056943459503900104
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/056943459503900104
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/056943459503900104?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffery M., 1993. "Legal requirements that artists receive resale royalties," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 163-177, June.
    2. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rui Cunha Marques & Álvaro Fonseca, 2010. "Market structure, privatisation and regulation of Portuguese seaports," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 145-161, March.
    2. Freddy Huet & Simon Porcher, 2013. "Innovation and regulatory outcomes: evidence from the public-private contracts for water supply in France," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur (ed.), Governance, Regulation and Innovation, chapter 9, pages 216-236, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Arblaster, Margaret & Zhang, Chrystal, 2020. "Liberalisation of airport air traffic control: A case study of Spain," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 38-47.
    4. Eshien Chong & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2014. "Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence," Post-Print hal-00512813, HAL.
    5. Luc Baumstark & Claude Ménard & William Roy & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2005. "Modes de gestion et efficience des opérateurs dans le secteur des transports urbains de personnes," Post-Print halshs-00103116, HAL.
    6. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    7. Andrea Boitani & Marcella Nicolini & Carlo Scarpa, 2013. "Do competition and ownership matter? Evidence from local public transport in Europe," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(11), pages 1419-1434, April.
    8. Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, 2004. "The Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts: A Literature Review," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2004n29, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    9. Eric J. Friedman* & Paul Resnick, 2001. "The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 173-199, June.
    10. Bickenbach, Frank & Kumkar, Lars & Soltwedel, Rüdiger, 1999. "The new institutional economics of antitrust and regulation," Kiel Working Papers 961, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    11. Brennan, Timothy J., 2000. "The Economics of Competition Policy: Recent Developments and Cautionary Notes in Antitrust and Regulation," Discussion Papers 10716, Resources for the Future.
    12. Saplacan, Roxana, 2008. "Competition in electricity distribution," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 231-237, December.
    13. Iossa, Elisabetta & Waterson, Michael, 2019. "Maintaining competition in recurrent procurement contracts: A case study on the London bus market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 141-149.
    14. Brunekreeft, Gert & Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2005. "Electricity transmission: An overview of the current debate," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 73-93, June.
    15. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-537, May.
    16. Klein, Michael, 1998. "Bidding for concessions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1957, The World Bank.
    17. Marian Moszoro, 2013. "Overcoming Opportunism in Public-Private Project Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 25(1), pages 89-96, March.
    18. Branko Bubalo, 2012. "Social costs of public service obligation routes—calculating subsidies of regional flights in Norway," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 125-140, July.
    19. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2000. "How to Auction an Essential Facility when Underhand Integration is Possible," Documentos de Trabajo 79, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    20. Spiller, Pablo T., 2013. "Transaction cost regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 232-242.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:amerec:v:39:y:1995:i:1:p:23-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://journals.sagepub.com/home/aex .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.