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Heterogenous Effects of the Determinants of Pro-market Reforms: Panel Quantile Estimation for OECD Countries

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  • Salih BARIŞIK

    (Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Tokat Gaziosmanpasa University, Turkey.)

  • Kubilay ERGEN

    (Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Tokat Gaziosmanpasa University, Turkey.)

Abstract

In empirical studies on what determines reform policies, the average effect of the main determinants of reforms on reform policies is explained; however, the issue of what determines the reform policies has not been addressed in the entire distribution. Therefore, we know very little about what triggered reforms at different levels of liberalization. In order to clarify this issue, the causes of reforms are estimated for OECD countries between 1996 and 2017 using the panel quantile method with non-additive fixed effects developed by Powell (2016) and the moment quantile regression method (MMQR) developed by Machado and Silva (2019). The results of both methods confirm that the reasons for the reforms have heterogeneous and asymmetrical effects on pro-market reforms. Contrary to the prediction of the famous crisis hypothesis, high inflation negatively affects reform policies in all quantiles. The impact of strong governments on reforms is significant and positive across the distribution. The contribution of right-wing governments to the implementation of pro-market regulations is especially evident in high quantiles where market interventions are high. There is weaker evidence for the output gap, unemployment level, and the impact of public debt on reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Salih BARIŞIK & Kubilay ERGEN, 2023. "Heterogenous Effects of the Determinants of Pro-market Reforms: Panel Quantile Estimation for OECD Countries," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(2), pages 36-51, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:rjr:romjef:v::y:2023:i:2:p:36-51
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    reforms; panel quantile method; OECD; crises hypothesis; market interventions. JEL classification:Journal: Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • O57 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
    • P11 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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