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Estimating the Impact of Central Bank Independence upon Macroeconomic Performance using a Panel Data Model

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  • Dumiter, Florin Cornel

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    (”Vasile Goldis” Western University of Arad, Faculty of Economic Sciences)

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    Abstract

    This paper analyzes a new index for measuring central bank independence and inflation targeting in order to evaluate and assess the impact of central bank’s independence level upon the macroeconomic performance. The new index for measuring central bank independence and inflation targeting has three main pillars: central bank political and legal independence, central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy and central bank transparency and accountability. Moreover, the paper intends to evaluate the impact of central bank independence based on the new index upon some macroeconomic indicators, such as the inflation rate, the output, the unemployment rate, the budgetary deficit and the current account deficit.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Institute for Economic Forecasting in its journal Romanian Journal for Economic Forecasting.

    Volume (Year): (2011)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 106-128

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    Handle: RePEc:rjr:romjef:v::y:2011:i:4:p:106-128

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    Related research

    Keywords: index of central bank independence and inflation targeting; central bank governance; central bank transparency and accountability; political and legal central bank independence; inflation rates; panel data;

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    References

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    1. Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Haan, Jakob de, 2001. "Inflation in developing countries: does Central Bank independence matter?," CCSO Working Papers 200101, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
    2. Cukierman, A. & Webb, S., 1994. "Political Influence on the Central Bank : International Evidence," Discussion Paper 1994-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Marco Arnone & Bernard J Laurens & Jean-Fran�ois Segalotto & Martin Sommer, 2009. "Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(2), pages 263-296, June.
    4. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Farvaque, Etienne & Héricourt, Jérôme & Lagadec, Gaël, 2008. "Central bank independence and ageing," MPRA Paper 13076, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
    7. Jean-François Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "Measures of Central Bank Autonomy," IMF Working Papers 06/228, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
    9. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, 2006. "Central bank independence and inflation: a note," Working Paper 0621, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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