Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Pretrial Negotiation
AbstractInfinitely repeated interaction between a defendant and a plaintiff can enhance the credibility of cheap talk and improve efficiency in outcomes that would be feasible without cheap talk. The basic driving force is reputation effect. If t he players are concerned about their reputation, cheap talk cannot be taken as meaningless even in a game where the interests of the players are sufficiently conflicting, because possible current gains from opportunistic behavior can be wiped out by future losses in payoff from damaged.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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