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Ryzyko polityczne w zarządzaniu długiem lokalnym w Polsce

Author

Listed:
  • Budzeń, Daniel

    (Gnieźnieńska Szkoła Wyższa Milenium)

Abstract

W artykule przedstawiono zagadnienia związane z występowaniem ryzyka politycznego w samorządzie lokalnym w Polsce. Podjęto próbę zidentyfikowania możliwości wystąpienia politycznego cyklu budżetowego w jednostkach samorządu terytorialnego. Na podstawie danych ze sprawozdań budżetowych została przeprowadzona analiza empiryczna finansów samorządowych z uwzględnieniem poziomu zadłużenia, wydatków majątkowych, a także wyniku budżetu. Prezentowane rezultaty badań obejmują wszystkie kategorie jednostek samorządu terytorialnego, tj. gminy, miasta na prawach powiatu, powiaty i województwa. Analiza obejmuje lata 2003-2019. Szczególne zainteresowanie wzbudziły lata wyborcze i okresy przedwyborcze. Część empiryczną poprzedza przegląd literatury zarówno w zakresie cyklu wyborczego, jak i ryzyka w zarządzaniu długiem lokalnym. Przyjęta struktura artykułu umożliwia uzyskanie odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy ryzyko polityczne występuje w badanych podmiotach?

Suggested Citation

  • Budzeń, Daniel, 2021. "Ryzyko polityczne w zarządzaniu długiem lokalnym w Polsce," Studia z Polityki Publicznej / Public Policy Studies, Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 8(2), pages 1-17, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:spppps:0017
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ugo Panizza, 2014. "Public Debt Risks in Italy Myths, Facts, and Policies," IHEID Working Papers 13-2014, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised 12 Feb 2014.
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    3. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    4. Linda Veiga & Francisco Veiga, 2007. "Political business cycles at the municipal level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 45-64, April.
    5. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems?," Working Papers 232, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ryzyko polityczne; dług lokalny; finanse samorządu terytorialnego;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories

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