Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Transferts financiers et optimum coopératif international en matière de pollutions-stocks


Author Info

  • Germain, Marc

    (CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain)

  • Toint, Philippe L.

    (Département de Mathématique, Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix)

  • Tulkens, Henry



It is well known that the transnational character of many environmental problems requires cooperation amongst the countries involved, if a social optimum is at all to be achieved. Most of the numerous contributions which deal with the problems raised by this cooperation only deal with pollutants that do not accumulate. On the other hand, a lot of contributions which deal with the dynamic dimension of the problem when the pollutant accumulates leave aside the issue of the voluntary implementation of the international optimum. The aim of the present contribution is to overtake the two above limitations. Using both cooperative game theory and differential game theory, we define by means of sidepayments a sharing scheme of the abatement costs between countries which makes cooperation both individually rational and coalitionally stable. Il est bien connu que le caractère transnational de certains problèmes d’environnement requiert que les pays concernés coopèrent afin d’atteindre l’optimum social. Parmi les nombreuses contributions qui ont traité des difficultés que cette coopération est susceptible de poser, beaucoup ne traitent que de pollutions qui ne s’accumulent pas. En revanche, nombre d’articles qui prennent en compte la dimension dynamique du problème quand il y a accumulation du polluant laissent de côté le problème de la mise en oeuvre volontaire de l’optimum international. La présente contribution vise à dépasser les limites précitées. Recourant à la fois à la théorie des jeux coopératifs et à celle des jeux différentiels, on établit au moyen de transferts financiers une répartition des coûts de dépollution entre pays qui rend la coopération à la fois individuellement rationnelle et rationnelle au sens des coalitions.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 75 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (mars-juin-septembre)
Pages: 427-446

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:75:y:1999:i:1:p:427-446

Contact details of provider:
Web page:
More information through EDIRC

Related research


Other versions of this item:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," CORE Discussion Papers 1994048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
  4. Veijo Kaitala & Matti Pohjola & Olli Tahvonen, 1992. "Transboundary air pollution and soil acidification: A dynamic analysis of an acid rain game between Finland and the USSR," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 161-181, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Maryse Labriet & Richard Loulou, 2008. "How Crucial is Cooperation in Mitigating World Climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, February.


This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:75:y:1999:i:1:p:427-446. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruce Shearer).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.