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Protection décentralisée des droits de propriété, police et justice

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  • Lasserre, Pierre

    (Département des sciences économiques, Université du Québec à Montréal)

Abstract

Neoclassical economists often praise the market as an institution allowing efficient, decentralized, decision making. In their analyses, which lead to the theorems of welfare, the cost of such institutions that allow markets to operate is usually ignored. One major such institution is the existence of well established property rights permitting exchanges to be carried out on the basis of mutual consent. Such rights are costly to establish and enforce. Recently, it was shown that decentralized enforcement is not generally desirable for society. This paper shows that such a form of organization is socially optimal if private enforcement activities are carried out within adequate police and justice institutions. Les économistes néo-classiques défendent souvent le marché comme une institution permettant des décisions décentralisées efficaces. Dans leur analyse, qui aboutit aux théorèmes du bien-être, ils ignorent en général le coût des institutions qui permettent le fonctionnement des marchés. L’une des plus importantes de ces institutions est l’existence de droits de propriétés bien établis permettant l’échange sur la base du consentement mutuel. Or de tels droits de propriétés sont coûteux à établir et à protéger. Récemment, il a été souligné que la décentralisation des activités de protection est socialement sous-optimale en général. Cet article montre qu’une telle forme d’organisation est socialement optimale si les activités privées de protection s’effectuent dans le cadre d’institutions de police et de justice appropriées.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 70 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (juin)
Pages: 177-189

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:70:y:1994:i:2:p:177-189

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  1. Shibata, Hirofumi & Winrich, J Steven, 1983. "Control of Pollution when the Offended Defend Themselves," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(200), pages 425-37, November.
  2. de Meza, David & Gould, J R, 1992. "The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 561-80, June.
  3. Oates, Wallace E, 1983. "The Regulation of Externalities: Efficient Behavior by Sources and Victims," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 38(3), pages 362-75.
  4. Wendy Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, 1992. "Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(1), pages 28-48.
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Cited by:
  1. Louis Hotte, 2005. "Natural-resource exploitation with costly enforcement of property rights," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 497-521, July.
  2. Lasserre, Pierre, 1994. "La Genèse, les coûts de transaction et l’économie de l’environnement," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(4), pages 383-397, décembre.
  3. Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Optimal Justice in a General Equilibrium Model with Non Observable Individual Productivities," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-37, CIRANO.
  4. Hotte, Louis & Long, Ngo Van & Tian, Huilan, 2000. "International trade with endogenous enforcement of property rights," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-54, June.

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