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De la empresa accionarial a la empresa participativa

Author

Listed:
  • José Ángel Moreno Izquierdo

    (Economistas sin Fronteras y Plataforma por la Democracia Económica)

Abstract

El artículo pretende ante todo sintetizar los argumentos económicos esenciales que posibilitan sostener que un modelo participativo de gobierno de la gran empresa cotizada es no sólo posible, sino más eficiente, justo y sostenible que el modelo convencional dominante en nuestro tiempo, basado en la soberanía de los accionistas. En este sentido, tras examinar muy sucintamente las características básicas del modelo accionarial y los principales argumentos con que la ortodoxia académica ha pretendido fundamentar su superioridad económica, se señalan los principales aspectos que frente a ellos viene planteando una corriente teórica plural y crecientemente amplia. Aspectos que apuntan hacia la deseabilidad y la viabilidad de un modelo de gobierno corporativo caracterizado por una participación significativa de los actores fundamentales para la actividad de la empresa. Un modelo que se considera preferible tanto en términos microeconómicos, morales y jurídicos como en términos de eficiencia, sostenibilidad y responsabilidad social corporativa. Un modelo que permitiría avanzar hacia una mayor democracia tanto en la empresa como en el conjunto de la sociedad.

Suggested Citation

  • José Ángel Moreno Izquierdo, 2019. "De la empresa accionarial a la empresa participativa," Revista de Economía Crítica, Asociación de Economía Crítica, vol. 28, pages 55-68.
    • Handle: RePEc:ret:ecocri:rec28_06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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