Del desespero de Greenspan a la esperanza de Obama: las bases científicas de la cooperación como principios de regulación
AbstractA common assumption, often accepted by regulators – that individuals act only in their narrow self-interest – is false. Evidence from both the natural and social sciences suggests that most people are strongly motivated to cooperate and help one another. Organizations (such as Toyota and Wikipedia) that cultivate and take advantage of these inclinations have prospered. Policy can be designed to incorporate attitudes toward cooperation, and to channel these tendencies in productive directions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.
Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
Issue (Month): 23 (July-December)
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cooperation; altruism; communication; critique of rational actor model; solidarity; situational framing; norms; trust; transparency; reputation; social dynamics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
183, CESifo Group Munich.
- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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