A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study -
AbstractIn this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting. We present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants' support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that besides profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2003-11.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: May 2003
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Decker,Torsten & Stiehler,Andreas & Strobel,Martin, 2002. "A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study," Research Memoranda 020, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology.
- Decker, T. & Stiehler, A. & Strobel, M., 2003. "A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games: an experimental study," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-4773, Maastricht University.
- NEP-ALL-2003-05-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2003-05-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2003-05-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2003-05-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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