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Federal Subsidization and State Medicaid Provision

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge Barro

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Stephen Barnes

    (Louisiana State University)

Abstract

This paper explores the determination of state Medicaid provision in the United States and quantifies the effects of federal subsidization on the provision. The U.S. federal government matches every state at least one dollar for each dollar that the state spends on Medicaid. We measure the effect of the subsidy by constructing a multi-regional, heterogeneous-agent, dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete insurance markets and calibrating it to the U.S. economy. In the model, state governments take the federal subsidy as given and implement Medicaid policy according to the decision of the median voter. The benchmark economy delivers a close approximation to the Medicaid coverage rate in 2012. To measure the effect of the federal subsidy, we set the subsidy to zero and find that state Medicaid coverage declines by 9%. We then study the mechanism determining Medicaid provision and find a positive relationship between progressivity of the tax structure and Medicaid coverage. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Barro & Stephen Barnes, 2016. "Federal Subsidization and State Medicaid Provision," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 21, pages 29-45, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:14-111
    DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2016.04.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public health insurance; Federalism; Political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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