Central Banking and the Choice of Currency Regime in Accession Countries
Abstract[fre] Banque centrale et choix de régimes de change pour les pays candidats à l’adhésion . Cet article étudie les évolutions institutionnelles des Banques centrales ainsi que les régimes de change des pays de l’Est, candidats à l’UE. Nous examinons les régimes actuels et comment ils doivent évoluer afin des respecter les critères d’entrée dans l’UE et l’UEM. De plus, nous étudions avec quel degré les pays candidats satisfont les critères d’accession et nous les comparons aux performances des derniers entrants dans l’UE. Après avoir conclu que les critères d’accession ne favorisent pas nécessairement un régime de change particulier, nous analysons le pour et le contre des deux régimes envisagés comme les plus stables - le currency board et la cible d’inflation. Sous ces deux régimes, le respect des critères de faible inflation et de stabilité des changes est susceptible de produire de fortes tensions. . Classification JEL : E58, F31, P20 [eng] This paper deals with the design of appropriate Central Banking arrangements and exchange rate regimes for those CEECs that are candidates for full membership in the EU. We give an overview of the existing arrangements and point out to which extent monetary arrangements are restricted by conditions for entry both into the EU and into the EMU. Furthermore we investigate to which degree countries are fulfilling the accession criteria and compare their performance with the performance of earlier EU joiners. After concluding that the accession criteria do not necessarily favour a particular monetary regime, we analyse the pros and cons of the two regimes widely believed to be most stable-currency boards or inflation targeting. Under either regime tensions are likely to arise from the attempt to meet the accession criteria of a low inflation rate and a stable exchange rate. . JEL classifications : E58, F31, P20
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière (English ed.).
Volume (Year): 6 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecofi
Other versions of this item:
- Willem H. Buiter & Clemens Grafe, 2001. "Central Banking and the Choice of Currency Regime in Accession Countries," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 11 edited by Morten Balling.
- Willem H. Buiter & Clemens Grafe, 2001. "Central Banking and the Choice of Currency Regime in Accession Countries," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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