The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union
AbstractDifferential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms among EU members is not an obstacle to monetary union. Neither is limited international labour mobility. Convergence of real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted capital mobility. The Maastricht criteria need not hinder monetary union provided the political will exists to adopt a flexible interpretations of the fiscal criteria. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (Supplement)
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