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Choix technologiques et stratégies de dissuasion d'entrée

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  • David Encaoua
  • Bruno Crépon
  • William James Adams

Abstract

[fre] Choix technologiques et stratégies de dissuasion d'entrée, . par William James Adams, Bruno Crépon, David Encaoua.. . Une entreprise peut sélectionner, au sein d'un ensemble d'innovations, la technologie qui lui est le plus favorable pour maintenir son pouvoir de marché. On avance ici l'hypothèse que la structure de marché résulte du choix technologique. Le modèle se présente sous la forme d'un jeu entre une firme installée et un entrant potentiel. En décidant alors les niveaux du coût unitaire minimal et de la taille efficiente, la firme installée peut, dans certaines conditions, dissuader l'entrée de son concurrent. [eng] Technological Decisions and Entry Dissuasion Strategies, . by William James Adams, Bruno Crépon, David Encaoua.. . A firm may opt for the technology most suitable for maintaining its market power from a number of innovations. It is argued here that market structure is the result of a technological decision. The model is based on the relationship between a firm which is already set up and another one planning on coming in. By determining the minimum unit cost level and efficient size, the existing firm can, under certain conditions, prevent its competitor from moving in on its territory. [ger] Technologische Optionen und Strategien zur Verhinderung des Marktzutritts von Konkurrenten, . von William James Adams, Bruno Crépon, David Encaoua.. . Aus einer Reihe von Innovationen kann ein Unternehmen die Technologie wählen, die sich für die Aufrechterhaltung seiner Marktmacht am besten eignet. In diesem Artikel wird die Hypothèse aufgestellt, daß die Struktur eines Marktes das Ergebnis der gewählten Technologie darstellt. Das Modell hat die Form eines Spiels zwischen einem etablierten Unternehmen und einem potentiellen "Newcomer". Indem das etablierte Untemehmen dann die Höhe der Mindeststückkosten und die für die Effizienz erf orderh'che Größe bestimmt, kann es unter bestimmten Bedingungen seinem Konkurrenten den Marktzutritt versperren. [spa] Decisiones tecnológicas y estrategias de disuasión de entrada, . por Willian James Adams, Bruno Crépon y David Encaoua.. . Entre un conjunto de innovaciones, una empresa puede elegir la tecnología que le resuite más favorable para mantener su poder de mercado. En el presente artículo se expresa la hipótesis que la estructura de mercado es el resultado de una opción tecnológica. El modelo se présenta en forma de juego entre una empresa establecida en el mercado y un outsider potential. Estableciendo los nivelés del coste unitario mnimo y el tamaño eficaz, la empresa establecida en el mercado puede, en determinadas condiciones, disuadir a la empresa de la competencia para que no pénètre en su mercado.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 102 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 27-36

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1992_num_102_1_5273

Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1992.5273
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecop

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  1. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1987. "Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 131-46, December.
  2. Gilbert, Richard J., 1989. "Mobility barriers and the value of incumbency," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 475-535 Elsevier.
  3. Dasgupta, Partha & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1980. "Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(358), pages 266-93, June.
  4. Vickers, John S, 1986. "The Evolution of Market Structure When There Is a Sequence of Innovations," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 1-12, September.
  5. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June.
  6. Avner Shaked & John Sutton, 1982. "Natural Oligopolies and the Gains from Trade," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 51, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  7. Gerosky, P A & Pomroy, R, 1990. "Innovation and the Evolution of Market Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 299-314, March.
  8. Edwin Mansfield, 1984. "R&D and Innovation: Some Empirical Findings," NBER Chapters, in: R & D, Patents, and Productivity, pages 127-154 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1985. "Innovation and Industry Evolution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(1), pages 81-99, February.
  10. David ENCAOUA, 1989. "Différenciation des produits et structures de marché: un tour d'horizon," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 15-16, pages 51-83.
  11. Dasgupta, Partha & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1981. "Entry, innovation, exit : Towards a dynamic theory of oligopolistic industrial structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 137-158.
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