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Should Merchant Transmission Investment be Subject to a Must-offer Provision?

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Author Info
Brunekreeft, G.
Newbery, D.

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Abstract

Merchant electricity transmission investment is a practically relevant example of an unregulated investment with monopoly properties. However, while leaving the investment decision to the market, the regulator may decide to prohibit capacity withholding with a must-offer provision. This paper examines the welfare effects of a must-offer provision prior to the capacity choice, given three reasons for capacity withholding: uncertainty, demand growth and pre-emptive investment. A must-offer provision will decrease welfare in the first two cases, and can enhance welfare only in the last case. In the presence of importer market power, a regulatory test might be needed.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0534.

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Length: 34
Date of creation: Aug 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0534

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Related research
Keywords: investment; must-offer; capacity withholding; regulation; electricity;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bushnell, James B & Stoft, Steven E, 1996. "Electric Grid Investment under a Contract Network Regime," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 61-79, July.
  2. Gilbert, Richard J., 1989. "Mobility barriers and the value of incumbency," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 475-535 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. B. Curtis Eaton & Roger Ware, 1987. "A Theory of Market Structure with Sequential Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 1-16, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Joskow, Paul L & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks I: Financial Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 2093, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Tanga McDaniel & Neuhoff, K., 2002. "Auctions to gas transmission access: The British experience," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0234, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  6. Richard Gilbert & Neuhoff, K. & Newbery, D., 2002. "Allocating Transmission to Mitigate Market Power in Electricity Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0225, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Joskow, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2004. "Merchant Transmission Investment," IDEI Working Papers 263, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    Other versions:
  9. Juan Rosellón, 2003. "Different Approaches Towards Electricity Transmission Expansion," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 2(3), pages 238-269, September. [Downloadable!]
  10. Newbery, D. & Tanga McDaniel, 2002. "Auctions and trading in energy markets -- an economic analysis," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0233, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  11. Brunekreeft, Gert, 2004. "Market-based investment in electricity transmission networks: controllable flow," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 269-281, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Richard J. Gilbert & David M. Newbery, 1994. "The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 538-554, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1987. "R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 402-20, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, 2004. "Access Holidays and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 80(248), pages 89-100, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gert Brunekreeft, 2002. "Regulation and Third-Party Discrimination in the German Electricity Supply Industry," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 203-220, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Brunekreeft, G. & Newbery, D., 2005. "Should Merchant Transmission Investment be Subject to a Must-offer Provision?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0534, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Hogan, William W., 2003. "Transmission Market Design," Working Paper Series rwp03-040, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  18. Brunekreeft, Gert, 2005. "Regulatory issues in merchant transmission investment," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 175-186, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Brunekreeft, G. & Neuhoff, K. & Newbery, D., 2004. "Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0463, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Gert Brunekreeft & David Newbery, 2006. "Should merchant transmission investment be subject to a must-offer provision?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 233-260, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Brunekreeft, G., 2004. "‘Regulatory Issues in Merchant Transmission Investment’," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0422, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  4. Adrien De Hauteclocque & Vincent Rious, 2008. "Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe," Post-Print hal-00338296_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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