The Failings Of Legal Centralism For Helping Stock Markets In Transition

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

The Failings Of Legal Centralism For Helping Stock Markets In Transition

Author Info

Edward STRINGHAM
Peter BOETTKE

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

After Czech voucher privatization many companies simply ignored the interests of their shareholders. The government has since increased the amount of regulation, but they have failed to establish significant investor confidence. This article offers some explanations of why their legal centric approach remains unlikely to create good corporate governance. Mandating that companies maximize shareholder value is easier said than done because it requires government to assess whether companies are making optimal business decisions. In former communist countries especially, government officials are ill suited to make such judgments because they lack the knowledge of how businesses should be properly run. Increased bureaucratic oversight in the Czech Republic has simply burdened markets without any noticeable positive results. This article discusses how good corporate governance can only be a byproduct of markets where managers compete for investors rather than something that can be created by law.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Politická ekonomie.

Volume (Year): 2006 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 22-34
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2006:y:2006:i:1:id:543:p:22-34

Contact details of provider:
Postal: nam. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3
Phone: (02) 24 09 51 11
Fax: (02) 24 22 06 57
Web page: http://www.vse.cz/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Redakce Politické ekonomie, Vysoká škola ekonomická, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3
Email:
Web: http://www.vse.cz/polek/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Vaclav Subrta).

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
P2 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Stringham, Edward, 2003. "The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth-century Amsterdam," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 321-344. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-57, January.
Clay, Karen, 1997. "Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 202-31, April.
Peter T. Leeson, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Arrangements and Heterogeneous Groups," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(4), pages 891-907, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Frank H. Easterbrook, 1997. "International Corporate Differences: Markets Or Law?," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 9(4), pages 23-30. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Klein, Peter G, 1996. " Economic Calculation and the Limits of Organization," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 3-28.

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer with RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-28.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.