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Hacia Un Mejor Gobierno Corporativo En Chile

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  • FERNANDO LEFORT

    ()
    (Escuela de Administración, Universidad Diego Portales)

  • RODRIGO GONZALEZ

    ()
    (Investigador Programa Doctoral Facultat de Economía i Empresa Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

This paper discusses the conceptual framework about corporate governance in emerging economies. Based on that framework and in the Chilean and international evidence, this paper analyses the main aspects concerning the corporate governance practices of Chilean companies, and explores several venues towards improving corporate governance in Chile.

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File URL: http://eacc10.puc.cl/files/ABT/Contenidos/Vol-11-N1/lefort.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal ABANTE.

Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 19-45

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Handle: RePEc:pch:abante:v:11:y:2081:i:1:p:17-37

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Web page: http://eacc10.puc.cl/RePEc/pch/
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Keywords: Corporate Governance; Emerging Markets; Chile;

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  1. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  2. Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Corporate Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
  3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 5879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Oliver D. Hart, 1988. "Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 467-76, August.
  6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  7. Walker, Eduardo & Lefort, Fernando, 2002. "Pension reform and capital markets : are there any (hard) links?," Social Protection Discussion Papers 24082, The World Bank.
  8. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Klapper, Leora F. & Love, Inessa, 2002. "Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2818, The World Bank.
  10. Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 6309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  12. Marco Becht & Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13330, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  13. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  14. Fernando LEFORT & Eduardo WALKER, 2007. "Do Markets Penalize Agency Conflicts Between Controlling And Minority Shareholders? Evidence From Chile," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 45(3), pages 283-314.
  15. Fernando Lefort & Eduardo Walker, 2000. "Ownership And Capital Structure Of Chilean Conglomerates:Facts And Hypotheses For Governance," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 3(1), pages 3-27.
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