Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
AbstractA political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Bank Group in its journal The World Bank Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 18 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jones, Chris & Morrissey, Oliver & Nelson, Doug, 2011. "Did the World Bank Drive Tariff Reforms in Eastern Africa?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 324-335, March.
- Richard Baldwin, 2011.
"Unilateral tariff liberalisation,"
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
gd10-159, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Francois, Joseph & Nelson, Douglas & Pelkmans-Balaoing, Annette, 2008.
"Endogenous Protection in General Equilibrium: Estimating Political Weights in the EU,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6979, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joseph Francis Francois & Douglas Nelson & Annette Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2008. "Endogenous Protection in General Equilibrium: estimating political weights in the EU," Economics working papers 2008-15, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.