Agency in Family Policy: A Survey
AbstractGiven that a child's birth and lifetime earning capacity are the result of actions undertaken by the child's own parents, if the government has an interest in the welfare or tax-paying capacity of its future citizens, it has no option but to condition the decisions of its present citizens. Parents are then, in the ordinary sense of the word, the government's agents. They are agents also in the technical sense of Principal-Agent theory if a parental action or personal characterisic of concern to the government is private information. Modelling family policy as an agency problem gives rise to a wealth of new results, and casts doubt on some established ones. (JEL codes: D13, D82, H24, H31, J13, J24) Copyright The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: firstname.lastname@example.org, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by CESifo in its journal CESifo Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 57 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000.
"Endogenous Fertility And The Design Of Family Taxation,"
CHILD Working Papers
wp03_00, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
- Alessandro Balestrino & Alessandro Cigno & Anna Pettini, 2002. "Endogenous Fertility and the Design of Family Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 175-193, March.
- Nerlove, Marc & Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1993. "Children: A Capital Good or a Base for Income Redistribution Policies," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 48(Supplemen), pages 78-84.
- Nava, Mario & Schroyen, Fred & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Optimal fiscal and public expenditure policy in a two-class economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 119-137, July.
- Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75.
- Michael Funke & Marc Gronwald, 2009.
"A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth,"
Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers
20906, Hamburg University, Department of Economics.
- Michael Funke & Marc Gronwald, 2009. "A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2692, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.