Corporate Design for Regulability: A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model
AbstractCorporate actors differ from individuals in that it may be possible to observe the formation of the corporate will from outside, and to influence its formation. This feature can be exploited by regulators. One technique is inducing corporate actors to hire an interface actor, representing the regulatory cause in the interior of the firm. Vice versa, firms may induce the regulator to give an interface actor access to the regulatory arena. This interface actor has the task of representing the commercial cause in regulatory decision-making. The paper uses a principal-agent-supervisor model to analyze the setting.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 162 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Other versions of this item:
- Christoph Engel, 2005. "Corporate Design for Regulability. A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_15, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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- Christoph Engel, 2006. "The Difficult Reception of Rigorous Descriptive Social Science in the Law," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_1, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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