Trading on Short-Term Information
AbstractThis paper shows that investors may want fund managers to acquire and trade on short-term instead of more profitable long-term information. This improves learning about managerial ability from performance observations, for two reasons. Firstly, short-term information is of higher quality, which allows the investor to draw sharper inferences over a manager's type. Secondly, performance observations under long-term informed trade are contaminated by noise contained in prices, which further weakens inference. The paper thus explicitly links the degree of short-term information dissemination to the profitability and the learning implications of short-term versus long-term informed trading.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 161 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
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- John Thanassoulis, 2011. "Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking," Economics Series Working Papers 571, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Casamatta, Catherine & Pouget, Sébastien, 2009. "Fund Managers' Contracts and Financial Markets' Short-Termism," IDEI Working Papers 553, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Feb 2011.
- Casamatta, Catherine & Pouget, Sébastien, 2009. "Fund Managers' Contracts and Short-Termism," TSE Working Papers 09-042, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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