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Long-term information, short-lived derivative securities

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Author Info
Dan Bernhardt (University of Illinois)
Ryan Davies (Queen's University)
John Spicer (Europe Economics)

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Abstract

This paper explores strategic trade in short-lived derivative securities by agents that possess long-term information about an underlying asset. In contrast to trading equity, where an informed agent will ultimately benefit from his trades, trading short-lived securities is profitable only if the price impounds the private information before expiry. A consequence is that a risk neutral informed agent's holdings of the short-lived security affect his trading behavior: Past informed trading leads to greater future informed trading. The shorter horizon in which information must be impounded for a short-lived security to pay off makes an informed agent more reluctant to trade at earlier dates. By characterizing the conditions under which liquidity traders choose to incur extra costs to roll over their short-term positions rather than trade in longer-term derivative securities, we provide a possible explanation for why most markets for longer-term derivative securities have little liquidity and large bid-ask spreads.

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File URL: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_994.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version 2000
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 994.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:994

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Related research
Keywords: Private information; liquidity; derivative securities; strategic trade;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. "Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 148-53, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Biais, Bruno & Hillion, Pierre, 1994. "Insider and Liquidity Trading in Stock and Options Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(4), pages 743-80. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-38, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Foster, F. Douglas & Viswanathan, S., 1994. "Strategic Trading with Asymmetrically Informed Traders and Long-Lived Information," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(04), pages 499-518, December. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Neuberger, Anthony, 1999. "Hedging Long-Term Exposures with Multiple Short-Term Futures Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(3), pages 429-59.
  7. Seppi, Duane J, 1990. " Equilibrium Block Trading and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 73-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1994. " Arbitrage Chains," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(3), pages 819-49, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Back, Kerry, 1993. "Asymmetric Information and Options," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 435-72. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Foster, F Douglas & Viswanathan, S, 1996. " Strategic Trading When Agents Forecast the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1437-78, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. " Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-70, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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