AbstractIn efficient markets the price should reflect the arrival of private information. The mechanism by which this is accomplished is arbitrage. A privately informed trader will engage in costly arbitrage, that is, trade on his knowledge that the price of an asset is different from the fundamental value if: (1) his order does not move the price immediately to reflect the information; (2) he can hold the asset until the date when the information is reflected in the price. We study a general equilibrium model in which all agents optimize. In each period, there may be a trader with a limited horizon who has private information about a distant event. Whether he acts on his information, and whether subsequent informed traders act, is shown to depend on the possibility of a sequence or chain of future informed traders spanning the event date. An arbitrageur who receiveds good news will buy only if it is likely that, at the end of his trading horizon, a subsequent arbitrageurs' buying will have pushed up the expected price. We show that limited trading horizons result in inefficient prices because informed traders do not act on their information until the event date is sufficiently close.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ in its series CEPR Financial Markets Paper with number 0035.
Date of creation: Oct 1993
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Other versions of this item:
- James Dow & Gary Gorton, 1993. "Arbitrage Chains," NBER Working Papers 4314, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James Dow & Gary Gorton, . "Arbitrage Chains," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 6-93, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- James Dow & Gary Gorton, . "Arbitrage Chains," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 06-93, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
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- Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
- Brennan, Michael J & Hughes, Patricia J, 1991. " Stock Prices and the Supply of Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(5), pages 1665-91, December.
- J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, .
"Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets,"
J. Bradford De Long's Working Papers
_124, University of California at Berkeley, Economics Department.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. "Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 148-53, May.
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