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Should Intergovernmental Transfers Provide Insurance to the States?

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Author Info
Emilio Espino

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Abstract

This paper studies the constrained efficient intergovernmental transfer contract between the central government and the states in a federal economy. We consider an environment with moral hazard, incomplete enforceability, and date-0 negotiation costs. The interaction of moral hazard and incomplete enforceability may imply that when the state's resources are "low enough," it is constrained efficient that the state gets a lower utility level than in autarky. When negotiation costs are considered, the state might not accept the contract. More importantly, the degree of acceptance of the contract by the state is not monotonically determined by the state's fiscal situation.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 161 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 103-
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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200503)161:1_103:sitpit_2.0.tx_2-d

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.

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