Communication, Reputation, and Punishment in Sequential Bargaining Experiments
AbstractExperiments on sequential bargaining have shown that subjects' behavior is far from the equilibrium prediction. Whereas previous models explain these deviations by some kind of social preferences, we investigate an alternative interpretation of behavior based on the assumption of bounded rational self-interest. Our analyses reveal that, in line with this interpretation, bargaining outcomes depend on subjects' payoff consequences from punishment. However, after preplay communication, we find a much weaker effect of these payoff consequences and a tremendous increase in the number of equal splits. This communication effect can be attributed to reputation effects only to a minor degree, if at all.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 160 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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- Sönke Hoffmann & Benedikt Mihm & Joachim Weimann, 2014. "To Commit or not to Commit? An Experimental Investigation of Pre-Commitments in Bargaining Situations with Asymmetric Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4835, CESifo Group Munich.
- Mohlin, Erik & Johannesson, Magnus, 2008. "Communication: Content or relationship?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 409-419, March.
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- Gary Bolton & Jeannette Brosig-Koch, 2012. "How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 623-649, August.
- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2011.
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- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2012. "Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 207-219.
- Zultan, Ro’i, 2012.
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- Roi Zultan, 2011. "Strategic And Social Preplay Communication In The Ultimatum Game," Working Papers 1107, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
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