Energy-Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities
AbstractThe paper is a general equilibrium analysis of an energy-tax reform in a federation, measuring the welfare effects and the vertical tax externalities. Vertical tax externalities may arise when two government levels impose taxes on common tax bases. We show how the magnitude and sign of the vertical externality depend on the environmental goal, the tax-recycling scenario, the initial local and federal tax shares, and the size of the federation. Simulations illustrate the effects for a small European federation (e.g., Belgium) and a large federation (e.g., the U.S.).
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.
Volume (Year): 64 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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