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Az euróövezet válságrendezése a liberális kormányköziség elméletének értelmezésében
[Crisis management in the Euro Zone from the perspective of liberal inter-governmentalism]

Author

Listed:
  • Benczes, István

Abstract

Az európai pénzügyi, gazdasági és adósságválság kapcsán kibontakozó válságrendezési folyamatokban különösen két terület kapott kitüntetett figyelmet az elmúlt közel egy évtizedben: a bajba került eladósodott tagállamok pénzügyi kimentése, illetve a bankrendszert érintő átfogó reformok, így különösen a bankunió kiépítése. Mindkét esetben kimutatható a tagállami közös érdek (az euróövezet stabilitásának megteremtése), ám mindkettő elosztási konfliktusokkal jár, azaz tisztázandó, hogy ki viseli az alkalmazkodás költségeit. Az ilyen helyzetek leírására és magyarázatára szolgál az integrációelméletek egyik legismertebbje: a liberális kormányköziség. A cikk megmutatja, hogy a liberális kormányköziség valóban segíthet a válságrendezés motivációinak és az alkuk kimeneteinek pontosabb megértésében, még ha nem is feltétlenül kínál teljes körű magyarázatot az uniós fejleményekre.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: E61, F55, H12.

Suggested Citation

  • Benczes, István, 2018. "Az euróövezet válságrendezése a liberális kormányköziség elméletének értelmezésében [Crisis management in the Euro Zone from the perspective of liberal inter-governmentalism]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 923-948.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1794
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2018.9.923
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

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