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Az európai gazdasági kormányzás előtt álló kihívások. A hármas tagadás lehetetlensége
[Challenges of European economic governance. The impossible trinity of denial]

Author

Listed:
  • Benczes, István

Abstract

Az európai gazdasági integráció folyamata olyan kényszerhelyzetekben formálódott a múltban, amelyek a közgazdaságtudományban jól ismert lehetetlen háromság alapján is leírhatók. Az Európai Monetáris Rendszer a rögzített árfolyam-mechanizmusra és önálló jegybanki politikára épített, korlátozva a tőkemozgásokat. A Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió ugyanakkor a tőke szabad áramlásával és az árfolyamok visszavonhatatlan rögzítésével felszámolta a tagállami szintű jegybanki autonómiát. Az euróövezet működése egyszersmind arra a háromszoros tagadásra épül(t), hogy 1. nem lehetséges az euróövezetből való kilépés, 2. nem engedélyezett a kimentés és 3. nem kerülhet sor államcsődre. A 2008-ban Európát is elérő pénzügyi és gazdasági válság azonban elemi erővel mutatott rá e hármas tiltás tarthatatlanságára. A gazdasági kormányzás körül kibontakozott viták így jól közelíthetők a három tiltó szabály egyidejű érvényesülése lehetetlenségének bemutatásával, számba véve az egyes opciók költségeit és lehetséges hasznait. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: E44, E63, H12, H63.

Suggested Citation

  • Benczes, István, 2011. "Az európai gazdasági kormányzás előtt álló kihívások. A hármas tagadás lehetetlensége [Challenges of European economic governance. The impossible trinity of denial]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 759-774.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1266
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, 2003. "Debt Intolerance," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 1-74.
    2. Paul De Grauwe, 2014. "The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Exchange Rates and Global Financial Policies, chapter 12, pages 297-320, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Weidenmier, Marc, 2010. "This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. By Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. $35.00," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 766-768, September.
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    6. Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2007. "Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262195534, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Győrffy, Dóra, 2013. "Crisis Management in the EU, Prospects for the De-politicisation of Economic Policy," Public Finance Quarterly, Corvinus University of Budapest, vol. 58(2), pages 119-132.
    2. Szűcs, Gábor, 2023. "Halmai Péter (szerk.): A Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió jövője. Európai perspektívák. Ludovika Egyetemi Kiadó, Budapest, 2021 [Halmai Péter (ed.): The future of the Economic and Monetary Union. Europe," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 233-241.
    3. Benczes, István, 2018. "Az euróövezet válságrendezése a liberális kormányköziség elméletének értelmezésében [Crisis management in the Euro Zone from the perspective of liberal inter-governmentalism]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 923-948.
    4. Csaba, László, 2011. "A magyar átalakulás és fejlődés néhány általánosítható elméleti tanulsága [Some generalizable theoretical lessons of the Hungarian transformation and development]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 813-831.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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