IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kea/keappr/ker-20220101-38-1-03.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Efficiency or Equity? Determinants of Regional Allocation of Infrastructure Investment in the Republic of Korea

Author

Listed:
  • Jongyearn Lee

    (KDI School of Public Policy and Management)

Abstract

We used a structural model to determine which aspects of efficiency and equity criteria were advocated in allocating investment in transportation infrastructure by region in the Republic of Korea during the period of 2001–2014. The estimation by the generalized method of moments indicated that the country’s regional allocation of public investment favored equity enhancement rather than efficiency gain. Empirical findings also include evidence of the substitutionary relationship between the investments by the central and regional governments, as well as the excess capital stock of transportation infrastructure compared with the optimum. The infrastructure needs and regional financial conditions had limited effects on the past allocation of investment. Political influence was exerted with respect to electoral productivity rather than partisanship.

Suggested Citation

  • Jongyearn Lee, 2022. "Efficiency or Equity? Determinants of Regional Allocation of Infrastructure Investment in the Republic of Korea," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 38, pages 73-108.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20220101-38-1-03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://keapaper.kea.ne.kr/RePEc/kea/keappr/KER-20220101-38-1-03.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aronsson, Thomas & Lundberg, Johan & Wikstrom, Magnus, 2000. "The impact of regional public expenditures on the local decision to spend," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 185-202, March.
    2. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2008. "The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2302-2319, December.
    3. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
    4. Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 103-119, January.
    5. Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 2002. "On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(1), pages 27-40, March.
    6. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
    7. Yu, Nannan & de Jong, Martin & Storm, Servaas & Mi, Jianing, 2013. "Spatial spillover effects of transport infrastructure: evidence from Chinese regions," Journal of Transport Geography, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 56-66.
    8. Knight, Brian, 2004. "Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 845-866, March.
    9. Cadot, Olivier & Röller, Lars-Hendrik & Stephan, Andreas, 1999. "A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Allocation: An Empirical Assessment," CEPR Discussion Papers 2336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Jeffrey P. Cohen & Catherine J. Morrison Paul, 2004. "Public Infrastructure Investment, Interstate Spatial Spillovers, and Manufacturing Costs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(2), pages 551-560, May.
    11. Case, Anne, 2001. "Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 405-423, March.
    12. Arellano, Manuel, 1989. "A note on the Anderson-Hsiao estimator for panel data," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 337-341, December.
    13. Norihiko Yamano & Toru Ohkawara, 2000. "The Regional Allocation of Public Investment: Efficiency or Equity?," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 205-229, May.
    14. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Markus Reischmann, 2016. "Empirical Studies on Public Debt and Fiscal Transfers," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 63.
    2. Castells, Antoni & Sole-Olle, Albert, 2005. "The regional allocation of infrastructure investment: The role of equity, efficiency and political factors," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 1165-1205, July.
    3. Abel Fumey & Festus O. Egwaikhide, 2018. "Political Economy of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: The Rural‐Urban Dynamics in Ghana," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 30(1), pages 33-44, March.
    4. Abel Fumey, 2018. "Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and tactical political maneuverings: Evidence from Ghana’s District Assemblies Common Fund," WIDER Working Paper Series 031, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Guccio, Calogero & Mazza, Isidoro, 2014. "On the political determinants of the allocation of funds to heritage authorities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 18-38.
    6. Elena Jarocinska, 2022. "Discretionary Grants and Distributive Politics: Evidence from Spain," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 64(4), pages 681-709, December.
    7. Abel Fumey, 2018. "Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and tactical political maneuverings: Evidence from Ghana's District Assemblies Common Fund," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-31, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. Raffaella Santolini, 2017. "Electoral Rules And Public Spending Composition: The Case Of Italian Regions," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 551-577, July.
    9. Mohanty, Biswajit & Bhanumurthy, N. R. & Dastidar, Ananya Ghosh, 2017. "What explains Regional Imbalances in Infrastructure?: Evidence from Indian States," Working Papers 17/197, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    10. Corvalan, Alejandro & Cox, Paulo & Osorio, Rodrigo, 2018. "Indirect political budget cycles: Evidence from Chilean municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 1-14.
    11. Kayode Taiwo & Linda G. Veiga, 2020. "Is there an “invisible hand” in the formula-based intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria?," NIPE Working Papers 02/2020, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    12. Linda Veiga, 2012. "Determinants of the assignment of EU funds to Portuguese municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 215-233, October.
    13. Kauder, Björn & Potrafke, Niklas & Reischmann, Markus, 2016. "Do politicians reward core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 39-56.
    14. Davide Luca, 2013. "Regional development goals and distributive politics in the allocation of Turkey's central investments: socioeconomic criteria, parties and legislators' personal networks," ERSA conference papers ersa13p981, European Regional Science Association.
    15. Biswajit Mohanty & N.R. Bhanumurthy & Ananya Ghosh Dastidar, 2017. "What explains regional imbalances in public infrastructure expenditure? Evidence from Indian states," Asia-Pacific Development Journal, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), vol. 24(2), pages 113-139, December.
    16. Kauder, Björn & Björn, Kauder & Niklas, Potrafke & Markus, Reischmann, 2016. "Do politicians gratify core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145509, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    17. Zheng, Xinye & Li, Fanghua & Song, Shunfeng & Yu, Yihua, 2013. "Central government's infrastructure investment across Chinese regions: A dynamic spatial panel data approach," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 264-276.
    18. Subhasish Dey & Kunal Sen, 2016. "Is partisan alignment electorally rewarding? Evidence from village council elections in India," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-063-16, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    19. Ali, Amin Masud & Savoia, Antonio, 2023. "Decentralisation or patronage: What determines government's allocation of development spending in a unitary country? Evidence from Bangladesh," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    20. Francesco Bogliacino & Mariacristina Piva & Marco Vivarelli, 2011. "The impact of R&D on employment in Europe: A firm-level analysis," DISCE - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali dises1176, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equity–Efficiency Trade-off; Transportation Infrastructure; Public Investment; Political Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20220101-38-1-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: KEA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/keaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.