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Information environment and interfirm alliance

Author

Listed:
  • Feng Gao

    (Rutgers Business School-Newark and New Brunswick)

  • Rong Zhong

    (University of Illinois at Chicago)

Abstract

Interfirm alliances require effective mechanisms that facilitate the integration of pertinent knowledge between independent firms. This paper examines whether a firm’s information environment helps improve collaborative outcomes. Using a large panel of firms engaging in global research and development (R&D) collaboration, we find that firms with better information environments are associated with a higher level of collaborative outputs and a broader scope of collaborative networks. The improvements in collaborative outcomes are more pronounced when alliance partners have a greater reliance on informal relationships instead of formal contracts. Further analysis shows that a better information environment helps foster a more durable relationship between partners. Lastly, a path analysis shows that facilitating interfirm collaboration is one of the main channels through which transparency boosts a firm’s innovative productivity. Overall, our findings suggest that the quality of a firm’s information environment plays a crucial role in sustaining efficient relational contracting in interfirm alliances.

Suggested Citation

  • Feng Gao & Rong Zhong, 2023. "Information environment and interfirm alliance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 643-677, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:60:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s11156-022-01105-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-022-01105-4
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Intellectual property; Business network; Strategic alliances; Relational contracting; Information asymmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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